GOM Oiled

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The Dieselduck
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Re: GOM Oiled

Post by The Dieselduck »

There is always more to the story, in every accident, and there is plenty of blame to pass around, and it doesn't always all belong to the most obvious "person". The Americans are very happy, and have a long history, in my view, of placing blame on the "one bad apple", never digging deeper (pardon the pun), which may shake the foundations of flawed processes and what is marketed as dream and ideals. Anyways, this article I just came across, is a bit scary. This gusher in the gulf, Macondo, is a reservoir the size of Mount Everest - enough oil to supply America for 8 months. Yikes. Better hope they cap this thing soon.

Martin
_____________________________

Obama Administration Knew About Deepwater Horizon 35,000 Feet Well Bore

President Obama and Secretary of Interior Ken Salazar, Secretary of Energy Steven Chu, and Defense Secretary Robert Gates were informed that BP would drill an unprecedented 35,000 feet well bore at the Macondo site off the coast of Louisiana. In September 2009, the Deepwater Horizon successfully sunk a well bore at a depth of 35,055 below sea level at the Tiber Prospect in the Keathley Canyon block 102 in the Gulf of Mexico, southeast of Houston.

During the September drilling operations, the Deepwater Horizon drill penetrated a massive undersea oil deposit but BP's priorities changed when the Macondo site in the Mississippi Canyon off the coast of Louisiana was found to contain some 3-4 billion barrels of oil in an underground cavern estimated to be about the size of Mount Everest. It was as a result of another 35,000 feet well bore sank by the Deepwater Horizon at the Macondo site that the catastrophic explosion occurred on April 20.

According to the Wayne Madsen Report (WMR) sources within the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Pentagon and Interior and Energy Departments told the Obama Administration that the newly-discovered estimated 3-4 billion barrels of oil in the Gulf of Mexico would cover America's oil needs for up to eight months if there was a military attack on Iran that resulted in the bottling up of the Strait of Hormuz to oil tanker traffic, resulting in a cut-off of oil to the United States from the Persian Gulf.

Obama, Salazar, Chu, and Gates green-lighted the risky Macondo drilling operation from the outset, according to WMR's government sources.

WMR learned that BP was able to have several safety checks waved because of the high-level interest by the White House and Pentagon in tapping the Gulf of Mexico bonanza find in order to plan a military attack on Iran without having to be concerned about an oil and natural gas shortage from the Persian Gulf after an outbreak of hostilities with Iran.

BP still has an ongoing operation to drill down to 40,000 feet below sea level at the Liberty field off the north coast of Alaska.

Source: http://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-Gener ... -Bore.html

By Wayne Madsen for Oilprice.com who offer detailed analysis on Oil, alternative Energy, Commodities, Finance and Geopolitics. They also provide free Geopolitical intelligence to help investors gain a greater understanding of world events and the impact they have on certain regions and sectors. Visit: http://www.oilprice.com
Posted in: OilPrice.com
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Re: GOM Oiled

Post by Big Pete »

Just heard on the UK News that Obamah has pulled the plug on BP's Alaskan well and one of Shells, deep water wells, saying he is concerned that they have not complied with all the safety Regs.

This man can talk the talk, but does he walk the walk?

BP
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Re: GOM Oiled

Post by Wyatt »

I don't think it is quite fair to insinuate the blame for this disaster is all Obama's fault. He inherited so many screw ups from the past retard. I wonder why anyone would want this job, but am certainly feeling safer and better since Obama arrived, and not another set of retards like Bush/Chaney. In the position of head of state, you would tend to think he is getting advice from many sources, but these sources are assuming that things are being done according to present ISM safety levels. When you begin to discover all sorts of safety protocols have been pushed aside by decisions being made by people who ought to know better, what are you to do? Fire everyone and start all over, which is where we seem to be right now, who do you trust? The Bank CEO's, Insurance Corp's, Money Investors, Big Oil Exec's, where and when will all this garbage leadership end? Greed is alive and well in Democracy, only wish Al 'Quida would concentrate thier efforts on these useless overpaid bigwigs instead of the poor working class infadels. Lets hope we find out the truth and not some cover up crap made up by BP!!!
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Re: GOM Oiled

Post by JK »

The oil spill explained in laymans terms:


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2AAa0gd7ClM
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Re: GOM Oiled

Post by The Dieselduck »

Here are some high quality pictures of the events down in the gulf, two months on...

http://www.boston.com/bigpicture/2010/0 ... s_lat.html
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Transoceans release internal findings

Post by The Dieselduck »

Fantastic video, detailing the time line of events regarding the blow out preventer, can be found http://www.deepwater.com/fw/main/Public ... -1076.html. The full report is available there as well.

Seems to me most systems worked as designed; unfortunately it was inadequate to contain the massive pressure of the reservoir. There is going to have to be some pretty fundamental changes to rig / bop design i.e. source of power not depending on diesels, proper shear rams....

Below is a brief overview of the findings.... Attached is the report's findings... not missing any opportunity to highlight BP's failure(s).

Martin
------------

Transocean Ltd. Announces Release of Internal Investigation Report on Causes of Macondo Well Incident

ZUG, SWITZERLAND, Jun 22, 2011

Transocean Ltd. (NYSE: RIG) (SIX: RIGN) today announced the release of an internal investigation report on the causes of the April 20, 2010, Macondo well incident in the Gulf of Mexico.

Following the incident, Transocean commissioned an internal investigation team comprised of experts from relevant technical fields and specialists in accident investigation to gather, review, and analyze the facts and information surrounding the incident to determine its causes.

The report concludes that the Macondo incident was the result of a succession of interrelated well design, construction, and temporary abandonment decisions that compromised the integrity of the well and compounded the likelihood of its failure. The decisions, many made by the operator, BP, in the two weeks leading up to the incident, were driven by BP's knowledge that the geological window for safe drilling was becoming increasingly narrow. Specifically, BP was concerned that downhole pressure -- whether exerted by heavy drilling mud used to maintain well control or by pumping cement to seal the well -- would exceed the fracture gradient and result in fluid losses to the formation, thus costing money and jeopardizing future production of oil.

The Transocean investigation team traced the causes of the Macondo incident to four overarching issues:

-- Risk Management and Communication: Evidence indicates that BP failed
to properly assess, manage and communicate risk to its contractors.
For example, it did not properly communicate to the drill crew the
absence of adequate testing on the cement or the uncertainty
surrounding critical tests and procedures used to confirm the
integrity of the barriers intended to inhibit the flow of hydrocarbons
into the well. It is the view of the investigation team that the
actions of the drill crew on April 20, 2010, reflected the crew's
understanding that the well had been properly cemented and
successfully tested.


-- Well Design and Construction: The precipitating cause of the Macondo
incident was the failure of the downhole cement to isolate the
reservoir, which allowed hydrocarbons to enter the wellbore. Without
the failure of the cement barrier, hydrocarbons would not have entered
the well or reached the rig. While drilling the Macondo well, BP
experienced both lost circulation events and kicks and stopped short
of the well's planned total depth because of an increasingly narrow
window for safe drilling, specifically a limited margin between the
pore pressure and fracture gradients. In the context of these delicate
conditions, cementing a long-string casing would increase the risk of
exceeding the margin for safe drilling. But rather than adjusting the
production casing design to avoid this risk, BP adopted a technically
complex nitrogen foam cement program that allowed it to retain its
original casing design. The resulting cement program was of minimal
quantity, left little margin for error, and was not tested adequately
before or after the cementing operation. Further, the integrity of the
cement may have been compromised by contamination, instability and an
inadequate number of devices used to center the casing in the
wellbore.


-- Risk Assessment and Process Safety: Based on the evidence, the
investigation team determined that BP failed to properly require or
confirm critical cement tests or conduct adequate risk assessments
during various operations at Macondo. Halliburton and BP did not
adequately test the cement slurry program, despite the inherent
complexity, difficulties and risks associated with the design and
implementation of the program and some test data showing that the
cement would not be stable. BP also failed to assess the risk of the
temporary abandonment procedure used at Macondo, generating at least
five different temporary abandonment plans for the Macondo well
between April 12, 2010 and April 20, 2010. After this series of
last-minute alterations, BP proceeded with a temporary abandonment
plan that created unnecessary risk and did not have the required
approval by the MMS. Most significantly, the final plan called for
underbalancing the well before conducting a negative pressure test to
verify the integrity of the downhole cement or setting a cement plug
to act as an additional barrier to flow. It does not appear that BP
used risk assessment procedures or prepared Management of Change
documents for these decisions or otherwise addressed these risks and
the potential adverse effects on personnel and process safety.


-- Operations:


-- Negative Pressure Test: The results of the critical negative
pressure test were misinterpreted. Post-incident investigation
determined that the negative test was inadequately set up because
of displacement calculation errors, a lack of adequate fluid
volume monitoring, and a lack of management of change discipline
when the well monitoring arrangements were switched during the
test. It is now apparent that the negative pressure test results
should not have been approved, but no one involved in the negative
pressure test recognized the errors. BP approved the negative
pressure test results and decided to move forward with temporary
abandonment. The well became underbalanced during the final
displacement, and hydrocarbons began entering the wellbore through
the faulty cement barrier and a float collar that likely failed to
convert. None of the individuals monitoring the well, including
the Transocean drill crew, initially detected the influx.


-- Well Control: With the benefit of hindsight and a thorough
analysis of the data available to the investigation team, several
indications of an influx during final displacement operations can
be identified. Given the death of the members of the drill crew
and the loss of the rig and its monitoring systems, it is not
known which information the drill crew was monitoring or why the
drill crew did not detect a pressure anomaly until approximately
9:30 p.m. on April 20, 2010. At 9:30 p.m., the drill crew acted to
evaluate an anomaly. Upon detecting an influx of hydrocarbon by
use of the trip tank, the drill crew undertook well-control
activities that were consistent with their training including the
activation of various components of the BOP. By the time actions
were taken, hydrocarbons had risen above the blowout preventer and
into the riser, resulting in a massive release of gas and other
fluids that overwhelmed the mud gas separator system and released
high volumes of gas onto the aft deck of the rig. The resulting
ignition of this gas cloud was inevitable.


-- Blowout Preventer (BOP): Forensic evidence from independent
post-incident testing by Det Norske Veritas (DNV) and evaluation
by the Transocean investigation team confirm that the Deepwater
Horizon BOP was properly maintained and operated. However, it was
overcome by the extreme dynamic flow, the force of which pushed
the drill pipe upward, washed or eroded the drill pipe and other
rubber and metal elements, and forced the drill pipe to bow within
the BOP. This prevented the BOP from completely shearing the drill
pipe and sealing the well.


-- Alarms, Muster, and Evacuation: In the explosions and fire, the
general alarm was activated, and appropriate emergency actions
were taken by the Deepwater Horizon marine crew. The 115 personnel
who survived the initial blast mustered and evacuated the rig to
the offshore supply vessel Damon B. Bankston.


The Transocean internal investigation team began its work in the days immediately following the incident. Through an extensive investigation, the team interviewed witnesses, reviewed available information regarding well design and execution, examined well monitoring data that had been transmitted real-time from the rig to BP, consulted industry and technical experts, and evaluated available physical evidence and third-party testing reports.

The loss of evidence with the rig and the unavailability of certain witnesses limited the investigation and analysis in some areas. The team used its cumulative years of experience but did not speculate in the absence of evidence. The report of the team does not represent the legal position of Transocean, nor does it attempt to assign legal responsibility or fault.

The investigation report and supporting documents are available on the homepage of the Company's website at http://www.deepwater.com.

About Transocean

Transocean is the world's largest offshore drilling contractor and the leading provider of drilling management services worldwide. With a fleet of 138 mobile offshore drilling units as well as three high-specification jackups under construction, Transocean's fleet is considered one of the most modern and versatile in the world due to its emphasis on technically demanding segments of the offshore drilling business. Transocean owns or operates a contract drilling fleet of 47 High-Specification Floaters (Ultra-Deepwater, Deepwater and Harsh-Environment semisubmersibles and drillships), 25 Midwater Floaters, nine High-Specification Jackups, 53 Standard Jackups and other assets utilized in the support of offshore drilling activities worldwide.

For more information about Transocean, please visit our website at http://www.deepwater.com.

SOURCE: Transocean Ltd.
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TRANSOCEAN Findings.pdf
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Responsibility

Post by The Dieselduck »

From Marex...http://www.maritime-executive.com/artic ... 013-03-15/

Ouch.... those trials and the players are so black and white....

Martin


Transocean Rig Maintenance Showed Negligence, Engineer Testifies

By MarEx

Transocean Ltd.’s internal documents show the company failed to maintain the Deepwater Horizon, avoiding critical repairs and upkeep for years before the drilling rig burned and sank in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010, an engineer testified in the trial over fault for the disaster.

Edward G. Webster, a marine engineering expert testifying for plaintiffs, reviewed in court yesterday a Transocean computerized maintenance system report for the Deepwater Horizon, dated a day before the April 20, 2010, blast, which listed 222 overdue maintenance tasks, including 76 “high priority” jobs.

“Safety critical” systems and equipment had been waiting for maintenance or repairs for months and, in some cases, years, Webster said, citing the report. Transocean owned the Deepwater Horizon, which exploded and sank off the Louisiana coast, setting off the largest offshore oil spill in U.S. history.

“This shows gross negligence to the rig,” Webster testified. The maintenance history of the Deepwater Horizon was “recklessly kept,” he said.

The blowout and explosion aboard the Deepwater Horizon killed 11 workers and spilled more than 4 million barrels of oil into the Gulf of Mexico. The accident sparked hundreds of lawsuits against London-based BP Plc, owner of the well, Vernier, Switzerland-based Transocean, and Houston-based Halliburton Co., which provided cement services.

Gross Negligence

A nonjury trial over liability for the disaster began Feb. 25 before U.S. District Judge Carl Barbier in New Orleans. Barbier will determine responsibility for the disaster and whether one or more of the companies acted with willful or wanton misconduct or reckless indifference -- the legal requirement for establishing gross negligence.

For BP, a finding of gross negligence would mean the company might be liable to the U.S. for as much as $17.6 billion in Clean Water Act fines, as well as unspecified punitive damages to claimants who weren’t part of the $8.5 billion settlement the company reached with most private party plaintiffs last year. For Transocean and Halliburton, findings of gross negligence would mean the companies could be held liable for punitive damages for all plaintiffs.

Webster testified that an e-mail from the Deepwater Horizon’s chief engineer to a Transocean manager also showed a lack of attention to maintenance.

‘Top Performer’

“Historically, the rig has been a top performer that has traded performance and staying in operation rather than maintaining the equipment,” Stephen Bertone, the chief engineer and maintenance supervisor, wrote in an Oct. 30, 2010, e-mail to Paul Johnson in Houston.

“When the rig does receive maintenance time, that time is generally taken up by repairing the equipment that was broke,” Bertone wrote, according to the exhibit of his e-mail displayed in court.

“That first sentence says it all,” Webster testified, under questioning by a plaintiffs’ attorney. “It suggests a severe lack of maintenance. It should have been put in the shipyard” for repairs, he said.

The Deepwater Horizon hadn’t been to a shipyard during its nine years of operations in U.S. waters, Webster said. He said he reviewed almost 10 years of maintenance audits of the rig.

Conrad “Duke” Williams, an attorney for plaintiffs, asked Webster why Transocean wouldn’t bring the rig into a shipyard for repairs.

Dry Dock

“When the rig is in dry dock, it’s not making money,” Webster said.

Bertone has invoked the Fifth Amendment right against self- incrimination and declined to testify at the trial.
Williams asked Webster if the Deepwater Horizon was seaworthy on the night of April 20, 2010.

“No, it was grossly unseaworthy,” Webster replied. “It was unseaworthy several years before that.”

John Kinchen, a Transocean attorney, challenged Webster’s description of the rig as unseaworthy, citing audits and inspections by licensing authorities such as the U.S. Coast Guard and maritime classification agencies including the American Bureau of Shipping.

The American Bureau of Shipping concluded the Deepwater Horizon was in good condition and compliant with the bureau’s requirements, Kinchen said during his cross-examination of Webster.

‘Blinders’

“They said it was in good condition; we know it was not,” Webster said. The ABS inspector “must have had blinders on,” the witness said.

The Coast Guard, which had the authority to “take the vessel out of service,” found the Deepwater Horizon compliant with maritime safety requirements following inspections dating to 2002, Kinchen said.

Webster dismissed Coast Guard inspections of offshore rigs in general as “cursory.”

Kinchen asked the witness if he also had a “major disagreement” with another international classification agency that also found the rig in compliance with safe maritime standards.

“Yes -- because they were probably not given the truth,” Webster said.

The trial is set to enter its fourth week on March 18 with Transocean beginning its defense. Transocean attorneys have said they will start with testimony from a drilling rig expert and a company employee who was in charge of firefighting operations on the Deepwater Horizon.

Cement Samples

Before yesterday’s testimony began, Halliburton said it would turn over missing cement samples from the Macondo well to the court. The company said it found the samples and would produce a report to the court on why they hadn’t been produced earlier to lawyers suing Halliburton over the spill.

Halliburton provided a timeline to the court late yesterday on its transfer of samples to the U.S. Joint Investigation Team. The company “properly preserved all rig samples, fully complied with all preservation orders, and expeditiously turned over all Macondo samples for testing to the JIT,” Halliburton lawyers said in the filing.

The plaintiffs and BP claim that the Halliburton cement, used to seal the well from hydrocarbon leaks, was defective. They contend Halliburton used leftover cement from BP’s Kodiak well off the Louisiana coast to prepare a cement barrier for the Macondo.

Halliburton said in yesterday’s filing that the company is “currently investigating a recent discovery of certain materials associated with” BP’s Kodiak well “that have been preserved and are currently being stored” at a Halliburton lab at Broussard, Louisiana.

The case is In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig Deepwater Horizon in the Gulf of Mexico on April 20, 2010, 10-md-02179, U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana (New Orleans).

Copyright 2013 Bloomberg.
Allen Johnson Jr. and Margaret Cronin Fisk --With assistance from Jef Feeley in Wilmington, Delaware. Editors: Peter Blumberg, Stephen Farr
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Re: GOM Oiled

Post by offshoresnipe »

Not sure why I can not get it to link to this site....

But google Stephen Bertone Chief Engineer and watch the video shot in 2010 on c-span.

INVESTGATION OF DEEPWATER HORIZON EXPLOSION, STEPHEN BERTONE.

It is long over a hour, so have a pint or two around.
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