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Final Report on the El Faro sinking

Posted: Mon Oct 02, 2017 11:09 am
by JK
The final marine report for the El Faro sinking is here:

https://media.defense.gov/2017/Oct/01/2 ... P%2017.PDF

It is worth reading.

NTSB Video

Posted: Tue Dec 12, 2017 3:57 pm
by JK
http://gcaptain.com/ntsb-video-details- ... s-el-faro/

This ship should never have been lost watching this.

Re: Final Report on the El Faro sinking

Posted: Thu Dec 14, 2017 1:09 am
by Big Pete
Very interesting Video raises several points.
Sending Weather information ONLY to the Captain's Office computer is seriously flawed, the Captain has to sleep!!!
The Officers of the watch on the Bridge have primary responsibility for the Safe Navigation of the ship, 24/7, including monitoring the weather, all weather reports should have been sent to the Bridge Computer and CC to individual Deck Officers computers and the ship's office computer. To make sure all relevant people had the same information if wanted.
It is interesting that the Private weather reports had fancy graphics but were 12 hours out of date!! It doesn't appear to be good Business to pay for information that is 12 hours out of date compared with a free service!! Unless the Company thinks it's Officers don't have the ability to understand a traditional weather report.
It appears very dangerous to start pumping ballast to correct a wind induced list and then change course so that the wind is on the other side, you will end up with double the list in the opposite direction, especially with the Free surface effect in the holds, it wasn't the right thing to do at all.
Why weren't all the hatches secured for bad weather and extra lashings put on the cars, there was plenty of warning and they discussed altering course to avoid the storm on several occasions, did no one think to call out all hands and secure the ship for bad weather? Or would that have cost too much money in overtime?
I wonder if the Engineers tried overfilling the sump to maintain oil suction?
A tragedy, and like all tragedies the result of a long chain of bad decisions made from the design stage, in the office ashore and operationally on board. De Mortui nil nisi bonum. If the Officers had received the right training in the first place and regular refresher training they would have acted differently.

Big Pete